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• Preferences satisfying negative certainty independence but violating betweenness.
• Answer an open question in the literature, posed in Dillenberger (2010).
• Extend the scope of applications of the negative certainty independence axiom.
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a b s t r a c t
Dillenberger (2010) introduced the negative certainty independence (NCI) axiom, which captures the
certainty effect phenomenon. He left open the question of whether there are continuous and monotone
preference relations over simple lotteries that satisfy NCI but do not belong to the betweenness class of
preferences considered by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986). We answer this question in the affirmative.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.h1. Introduction
Dillenberger (2010) suggests negative certainty independence
(henceforth NCI) as a behavioral axiom, imposed on preferences
over monetary lotteries, that captures Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) idea of ‘‘certainty effect’’. NCI is a weakening of the stan-
dard vNM-independence that can accommodate, for example,
the typical behavior reported in experimental studies of the Al-
lais paradoxes (common ratio and common consequence effects).
Dillenberger explored the implications of NCI in other domains,
and established an equivalence between static preferences that
satisfy NCI, dynamic preferences that display preferences for
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.010one-shot resolution of uncertainty, and preferences over informa-
tion structures that rank perfect information as the most valuable
information system. The leading example of a known model that
satisfies NCI is Gul’s (1991) theory of disappointment aversion.1 All
known examples, including Gul’s model, belong to the class of be-
tweenness preferences, studied in Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986).
Dillenberger left open the question of whether there are continu-
ous and monotone preferences that satisfy NCI but not between-
ness. Since betweenness preferences represent a thin segment of
non-expected utility models, and they have relatively little empir-
ical support (see, for example, Camerer and Ho (1994)), answering
this question is important in order to understand the scope of ap-
plication of the NCI axiom. In this note, we provide an example of
such a preference relation.
1 Gul’s model has one additional parameter, β ∈ (−1,∞), compared to the
regular expected utility model. Positive values of β correspond to ‘‘disappointment
aversion’’ and negative values correspond to ‘‘elation seeking.’’ If β = 0, then the
model is reduced to expected utility. Gul’s preferences satisfy NCI if and only if
β > 0, that is, if the decision maker is disappointment averse.
ts reserved.
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Consider an interval [w, b] = X ⊂ R of monetary prizes. Let
L be the set of all simple lotteries (probabilitymeasureswith finite
support) overX . For each p, q ∈ L andα ∈ (0, 1), themixtureαp+
(1− α) q ∈ L is the simple lottery that yields each prize x with
probability αp (x)+(1− α) q (x). We denote by δx ∈ L the degen-
erate lottery that gives the prize xwith certainty, that is, δx (x) = 1.
Note that for any lottery p ∈ Lwe have p =x∈X p (x) δx.
Let ≽ be a preference relation (complete and transitive binary
relation) over L. We assume that ≽ is continuous (with respect
to the weak topology) and monotone with respect to first-order
stochastic dominance. A function V : L→ R represents≽ if p ≽ q
⇔ V (p) ≥ V (q).
The following axiom was introduced and motivated by Dillen-
berger (2010); it is a weakening of the vNM-independence axiom
that takes into account the certainty effect.
Axiom 1 (Negative Certainty Independence (NCI)). For all p, q, δx ∈
L andλ ∈ [0, 1], p ≽ δx implies thatλp+(1−λ)q ≽ λδx+(1−λ)q.
In words, the axiom states that, if the decision-maker weakly
prefers a lottery to a degenerate lottery yielding a sure monetary
prize, then mixing both lotteries with the same third lottery (us-
ing the same weight) should not reverse the preference. Roughly
speaking, the idea is that a sure outcome suffers more (or gains
less) than any lottery frommixtures that eliminate its certainty ap-
peal. As we pointed out in the introduction, NCI played a key role
in the analysis of Dillenberger (2010).2
The next axiom,whichwas first introduced by Chew (1989) and
Dekel (1986), is a different weakening of the vNM-independence
axiom, and is called betweenness.
Axiom 2 (Betweenness). For all p, q ∈ L and α ∈ [0, 1], p ≽ q
implies that p ≽ αp+ (1− α) q ≽ q.
Betweenness implies neutrality towards mixtures of two in-
different lotteries.3 Dillenberger (2010) left open the question of
whether there are continuous and monotone preference relations
overL that satisfy NCI but not betweenness.4 The next proposition
gives an affirmative answer.
2 To see how NCI can accommodate the behavior observed in Allais’ paradoxes,
consider, for example, (a version of) Allais’ common ratio effect. Subjects choose
between A and B, where A = $3000 and B = 0.8 chance of $4000 and 0.2 chance of
$0. They also choose between C and D, where C = 0.25 chance of $3000 and 0.75
chance of $0, and D = 0.2 chance of $4000 and 0.8 chance of $0. The majority of
subjects choose the pair (A,D), in violation of expected utility (note that options C
and D are obtained by mixing options A and B, respectively, with the option that
yields $0 for sure). NCI is consistent with this behavior, since the only pattern of
choice which is inconsistent with NCI is the pair (B, C); this pattern, however, is
rarely observed.
3 Therefore, betweenness indifference curves in any probability triangle are
straight lines, though, unlike in expected utility, they need not be parallel.
4 Without continuity and monotonicity, it is relatively easy to construct prefer-
ences that satisfy NCI and not betweenness. For example, let V (p) = i U (xi, p)
p (xi), where
U (xi, p) =

v (xi) p = δxi
u (xi) otherwise
and v (x) > u (x) for all x. These discontinuous preferences first studied by Schmidt
(1998) and further analyzed in, for example, Andreoni and Sprenger (2009). These
preferences satisfy NCI: V (p) ≥ V (δx) is equivalent toi u (xi) p (xi) ≥ v (x), and,
since v (x) > u (x),
V (αp+ (1− α) q) =

i
u (xi) (αp (xi)+ (1− α) q (xi))
≥ αu (xi)+ (1− α)

i
u (xi) q (xi) = V (αδx + (1− α) q) .Proposition 1. There is a continuous and monotone function V :
L → R, which represents preferences that satisfy NCI but not be-
tweenness.
Proof. Fix n,m such thatw < n < m < b. Let
u1(x) = x, and
u2(x) =

x+m
2
if x > m
x ifm ≥ x ≥ n
x+ n
2
if n > x.
For i = 1, 2, denote by ei (p) the expected utility of a lottery p ∈ L
using the function ui, that is, ei (p) =x ui(x)p (x). Define
V (p) = min {e1(p), e2(p)} .
Wenowverify thatV satisfies all properties in Proposition 1.5 Since
both u1 and u2 are continuous and bounded, their respective ex-
pectations are also continuous, and thus V is continuous. To show
monotonicity, note that, if p first-order stochastically dominates q,
then ei(p) > ei(q) for i = 1, 2, and thus V (p) > V (q), as required.
To show thatNCI is satisfied,we first define, for a given lottery p,
the lotteries pL, pM , and pH as the restrictions of p to outcomes, re-
spectively, strictly less than n, between n andm, and strictly larger
than m. Let αL, αM , and αH be the probabilities assigned to each
interval by p. Then
p = αLpL + αMpM + αHpH .
Note that
e1(p) = αLe1(pL)+ αMe1(pM)+ αHe1(pH)
and that
e2(p) = αL n+ e1(pL)2 + αMe1(pM)+ αH
m+ e1(pH)
2
:= ψ(p)+ e1(p)
2
,
where ψ(p) = αLn + αMe1(pM) + αHm. Since e1(pM) ∈ [n,m],
ψ(p) ∈ [n,m] as well. Summing up,
e2(p) = e1(p)+ ψ(p)2 , ψ(p) ∈ [n,m]. (1)
Suppose that NCI is not satisfied. Then there exist p, q, x, and
α ∈ (0, 1) such that
V (p) ≥ V (δx), and (2)
V (αp+ (1− α) q) < V (αδx + (1− α) q). (3)
Without loss of generality, let V (δx) = ek(δx) ≤ ej(δx), where {j, k}
= {1, 2}. That is, if k = 1 then V (δx) = x, and if k = 2 then
V (δx) = m+x2 . From (2), we have
ej(p), ek(p) ≥ min{ej(p), ek(p)} = V (p) ≥ ek(δx),
These preferences violate betweenness. For example, take u (x) = x and v (x) = 2x,
and observe that
V (δ1) = V (0.5δ4 + 0.5δ0) = 2 > 1.5 = V (0.5δ1 + 0.5 (0.5δ4 + 0.5δ0)) .
5 When we discuss these properties, we use the function V and the underlying
preferences≽ interchangeably.
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ej(p), ek(p), ej(δx) ≥ ek(δx). (4)
By (3),
V (αp+ (1− α) q) < V (αδx + (1− α) q)
≤ ej(αδx + (1− α) q), ek(αδx + (1− α) q). (5)
If V (αp+(1− α) q) = ek(αp+(1− α) q), then (5) implies that
ek(αp+ (1− α) q) < ek(αδx + (1− α) q) and, therefore, ek(p) <
ek(δx), which is a contradiction to (4).
If V (αp+ (1− α) q) = ej(αp+ (1− α) q), then (5) implies that
ej(αp+ (1− α) q) < ej(αδx + (1− α) q) and, therefore,
ej(p) < ej(δx). (6)
Thus ek(δx) ≤ ej(p) < ej(δx), which implies that ek(δx) ≠ ej(δx).
Then there are two possibilities: either x < n or x > m.
If x < n, then e1(δx) = x < x+n2 = e2(δx), so k = 1. By (4),
e1(p) = ek(p) ≥ ek(δx) = x.
Recall from (1) that ψ(p) ≥ n. Since e1(p) ≥ x,
e2(p) = ψ(p)+ e(p)2 ≥
n+ x
2
= e2(δx).
Equivalently, ej(p) ≥ ej(δx), which is a contradiction to (6).
If x > m, then e1(δx) = x > x+m2 = e2(δx), so k = 2. By (6),
e1(p) = ej(p) < ej(δx) = x.
Recall from (1) that ψ(p) ≥ n. Since e1(p) < x,
e2(p) = ψ(p)+ e(p)2 <
m+ x
2
= e2(δx).
Equivalently, ek(p) < ek(δx), which is a contradiction to (4).
Lastly, we show that V violates betweenness. Pick 0 < ε <
min {2 (n− w) , b−m,m− n}, and consider the lotteries p = 23δn
+ 13δ(m+ϵ) and q = 13δ(n− ϵ2 ) + 13δ(n+ϵ) + 13δm. Note that
e1(p) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
3
ϵ,e2(p) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
6
ϵ,
e1(q) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
6
ϵ,
e2(q) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
4
ϵ,
so
V (p) = e2(p) = e1(q) = V (q).
For any α ∈ (0, 1),
e1(αp+ (1− α) q) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
6
(1+ α) ϵ,
e2(αp+ (1− α) q) = 23n+
1
3
m+ 1
6

3− α
2

ϵ,
and, therefore,
V (αp+ (1− α) q) = 2
3
n+ 1
3
m+ 1
6
ϵ ×

1+ α α ≤ 1
3
3− α
2
α >
1
3

≠ V (p) = V (q). 
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